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NOTES
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUAL SOVEREIGNS
The first part of this paper is directed toward searching for an ex-
pression, in a religious code or ethical system which exerted some influ-
ence on English thought, of a philosophical position which might have
formed the basis for the legal principle known as "double jeopardy."'
One system, the impact of which was largely transmitted through
Christianity, was the Hebrew religious code.' The basis of Hebrew law
was the Pentateuch,' and there are no explicit references in it to two
punishments for the same conduct. There are passages which are subject
to the interpretation that they indicate that two punishments for the same
conduct would have offended the Hebrew sense of justice. For example,
after Cain had killed Abel and God had banished Cain:
Cain said, 'My punishment is too great to bear. You are
driving me today from the soil; and from your face I shall be
hidden. And I shall be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth,
and whoever finds me will kill me.' But the Lord said to him,
'Not so! Whoever kills Cain shall be punished sevenfold.'
Then the Lord gave Cain a token so that no one finding him
should kill him.4
Obviously this is not a conclusive passage.
Horowitz mentions a situation where the Hebrew law punished by
lashes the killing of a dam and her young on the same day. It was also
forbidden to offer a sacrifice to an idol and the punishment was death.5
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . ." At the English common law
this principle was embodied in the plea of autrefoits acquit or convict. 2 HAwKINs,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 515 (8th ed. 1824).
2. There is no logical reason why the sources of the Jewish law should not be ex-
amined, but rather a practical one that the sources are not definitely known. The preva-
lent opinion is that the Hammurabi code was not a model for the Jewish lawmakers but
that both drew upon a common source of ethical principles. There is some evidence that
parts of the Hebrew law were a gloss upon the Babylonian law. For example, burning
is mentioned in Leviticus 20:14 and 21:9 as a punishment for the same two offenses set
forth in the Hammurabi code for which burning is prescribed, i.e. incest and inchastity
in a priest's daughter. HAMMURABI, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 54 (ed. by Driver and
Miles 1952).
3. The "Torah of Moses" including the first five books of the Bible: Genesis, .Ex-
odus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.
4. Genesis 4:13.
5. HoRowiTz, THE SPIRIT OF JEwIsEr LAW 170 (1953).
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He then quotes from the Torah that, ". . . for one offense only one
punishment might be inflicted, not lashes and then the death penalty.
Makkot 13b."' This seems to be the only explicit reference to double
jeopardy in the Hebrew law, and there seems to be none in the Baby-
lonian code of Hammurabi.
A direct impact of the Mosaic law on English law is noticed in the
reign of Alfred beginning in 871 A.D. Alfred issued a set of laws
largely taken from Mosaic law which included the Ten Commandments,
and extracts from Exodus and Acts.7 There is no reference to double
jeopardy in these passages and the impact is not certain.
Christianity was heir to the ethical evolution of Judaism and it had
a tremendous influence on English law. Through the Church, the philo-
sophical position on double punishment expressed in the Hebrew law'
could have been transmitted to English thought. Christianity was intro-
duced in England during the later years of the Roman occupation but was
virtually crushed by the Anglo-Saxon invaders in the fifth century.9 The
reconversion of Great Britain began in 597 A.D. with the arrival of St.
Augustine," and for the next 1000 years played an increasingly important
role in British affairs. By the twelfth century some persons were amen-
able to the jurisdiction of both royal and ecclesiastical courts, and the
loyalties owed to each were potentially incompatible. The great conflict
between Thomas Beckett, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Henry II in
the twelfth century was partly based on the Church's desire to try and
punish violators of the law who were clerks. Beckett said that persons
amenable to both jurisdictions should not be tried twice-they should be
tried only in the Church courts." Henry II demanded that "criminous
clerks" be accused in the royal court, tried and if found guilty unfrocked
in the Church court, and returned to the royal court for punishment. This
was inserted in the third clause of the Constitution of Clarendon."
It is not apparent that the Constitution of Clarendon provided for
trying anyone twice at all. It did provide for two punishments in that
the clerk was tried in a Church court and if found guilty, unfrocked, and
then sent back to the royal court for punishment. In the Church court,
unfrocking was the punishment for murder." It was of a different sort
6. Ibid.
7. 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 53 (1883); LUNT, His-
TORY OF ENGLAND 45 (Rev. ed. 1928).
8. See note 5 supra.
9. PLUCKNETT, A CONCIsE HISTORY OF THE COmmON LAW 8 (5th ed. 1956).
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 17.
12. SMITH, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 61 (1949).
13. Id. at 60.
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than the death penalty inflicted in the royal courts, but it was the punish-
ment provided for in the ecclesiastical courts. It may be that Beckett's
fight against allowing a person to be tried twice was not directed spe-
cifically at the Constitution of Clarendon but rather to a less clearly
defined, as yet unrealized practice.1 4 In any case it is the type of argu-
ment that is readily seized upon and later magnified into an immutable
principle of the law, as was done with Magna Carta by Lord Coke." The
murder of Beckett forced Henry to capitulate to the Church position."
There is no evidence of a direct link between the rabbinic law on
double punishments and Beckett's position in twelfth century England,
but Christianity adopted or carried on much of the ethical tradition of
Judaism. When the principle concerning double jeopardy is found in
different ethical systems at different periods of time, this is evidence that
the principle is felt to be basic to a just legal system. On the other hand,
it could be argued that in one sense, double punishment for the same con-
duct is implicit in Christianity. The ecclesiastical courts punish now and
God will also punish later. Thus it seems that double punishment was
accepted by Jews and Christians alike from the very inception. of their
religion.
Another major influence on English law was the Roman law which
was exerted through the treatise writers, especially Bracton. Directly or
indirectly, Bracton derived most of the definitions and principles from
the Roman system because no other was then in existence." It had little
effect on modes of procedure, however. The clergy were students of Ro-
man law, and the earliest justices of the common law courts, as well as
the chancellors, were taken from the higher orders of ecclesiastics."8
When those judges had to formulate principles they naturally would turn
to the ideas they were familiar with from the study of Roman law. By
the fourteenth century the clergy's monopoly on education was broken
and there began arising a group of secular writers trained in the Roman
law.1 9 Thus the Roman law had a continuing impact on English law.
There seems to have been no reference in Bracton to the problem of
double jeopardy but it becomes important a few centuries later. There is
evidence that the principle of double jeopardy was not native to England
and that it therefore came from the continent either through Roman law
14. It is interesting for our purposes as a statement of a philosophical position on
the question of double jeopardy held by a very influential Englishman. Casting the
philosophical thought into the legal mold would come later.
15. McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 COLUm. L. REv. 27 (1914).
16. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 12.
17. 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 52.
18. Lobingier, 25 A. B. A. J. 265 (1939).
19. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 109.
446
NOTES
or more likely through the canon law of the Church. The Anglo-Saxons
had a system where the King exacted a penalty for criminal behavior and
the injured party was also allowed to demand a penalty.2" This practice
continued after the Conquest in the form of the appeal,21 but the punish-
ment by one party precluded further punishment by the other. Henry VII
did force passage of a statute which allowed an appeal to be brought after
an acquittal on an indictment for murder.22 It is significant in that a
statute was required to allow successive prosecutions and prevent a ver-
dict from being a bar to any further prosecution. The statutory excep-
tion was limited to acquittals in murder cases, and in practice the accused
was still only tried once."
Other Anglo-Saxon principles were slowly subverted and erased by
the introduction of Roman law through the Norman clergy, e.g., the pre-
sumption of innocence.2" Double punishment for the same conduct may
have followed the same pattern.
The philosophical prohibition against double punishment is well suited
to being cast into a legal framework. In the English common law, this
took the form of a dilatory plea of autrefoits acquit or convict.2" The
first square holding that a prosecution in a foreign country in a court of
competent jurisdiction would be a bar to another prosecution in England
for the same conduct was King v. Hutchinson.2  The defendant killed a
Mr. Colson in Portugual and was acquitted there. The King wanted
Hutchinson tried again when he had returned to England but the judges
agreed that the acquittal in Portugual was a bar to further prosecution.
Two other cases are often relied on to show that the British rule
prohibited successive prosecutions by dual sovereigns.2 7 In one case, the
court held that an acquittal in a court of grand sessions in Wales was a
bar to further prosecution in an English court.28 But this case arose
after several statutes20 had been passed extending English law to all of
20. Id. at 24.
21. 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 244.
22. 3 Hen. 7, c. 1.
23. 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 249.
24. Lobingier, supra note 18, at 269.
25. 2 HAWKINS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 515.
26. 3 Keb. 785, 84 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1678). The facts are not reported at this
cite but were gleaned from two other cases. Beak v. Thyrwhit, 3 Mod. 194, 87 Eng.
Rep. 124 (K.B. 1689) ; King v. Roche, 1 Leach 134, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (Crown 1775).
27. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1309
(1932) ; Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Conznwn Law and British
Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1956). Mr. Grant cites King v. Thomas,
infra note 28, and King v. Roche, supra note 26, as foreign sovereign cases. It is sub-
mitted that this is erroneous.
28. King v. Thomas, 1 Lev. 118, 83 Eng. Rep. 326 (K.B. 1664).
29. 27 Hen. 8, c. 26; 34 Hen. 8, c. 26.
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Wales and ordering the justices to administer justice to all "according to
the laws, statutes, and customs of the realm of England."3  Thus when
the case arose, Wales had been legally incorporated into England and the
court was holding that successive prosecutions in English courts under
English law were prohibited.
A similar situation was presented in a case where the defendant
killed a man at the Cape of Good Hope and was acquitted there.3 He
was tried again in England and the prosecution moved that the jury be
charged as to the defendant's pleas of autrefoits acquit and not guilty.
The court refused saying that the jury would have to find on both
charges, and if they found for the defendant on the former the second
would be barred. This is not a foreign sovereigns problem either, be-
cause the Cape of Good Hope was an English colony and operated under
English law.3"
In both of these cases the court held that successive prosecutions by
the same sovereign for the same conduct was prohibited. These cases do
not directly support the rule that successive prosecutions by different
sovereigns for the same conduct is prohibited, but they are evidence that
the rule against successive prosecutions in general was well established.
The double jeopardy clause was adopted by the writers of the United
States Constitution without extended debate or explicit indication of the
meaning it was intended to have. They said that it was to be "declaratory
of the law as it now stood" and was to conform to the "universal practice
in Great Britain and in this country."33  It was proposed that the Fifth
Amendment only bar successive prosecutions "for the same offense by
any law of the United States."34  This was not adopted.
The fact that there is no record of any debate or controversy over
putting the clause in the Bill of Rights seems to indicate that it expressed
a universal sentiment on the part of the colonial leaders. If the clause
had been susceptible of several different interpretations, its insertion in
a basic legal document surely would have stirred up controversy and de-
bate. The clause was also put into several of the early state constitutions."3
King v. Hutchin.son is the clearest expression of what the English
practice was at the time of the adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, and
30. 34 Hen. 8, c. 26.
31. King v. Roche, 1 Leach 134, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (Crown 1775).
32. 1 Stephen, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 214.
33. Note, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 521 (1958).
34. Id. at 527.
35. N.H. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1784); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (1780); DEL. CoNST.
art. I, § 8 (1792), N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1821).
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apparently the rule in that case was intended to be incorporated in the
Fifth Amendment.
The present American doctrine was stated in United States v. Lanza,
the first case to squarely present to the Supreme Court the question of
the validity of a federal prosecution subsequent to a state prosecution for
the same conduct.3" The defendant was indicted in federal court for
manufacturing, transporting, possessing, and having on hand materials
for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor in violation of the National
Prohibtion Act. He filed a plea in bar alleging that an information had
previously been filed in a state court and judgment rendered against him
for the same conduct with the same liquor. The District Court overruled
the United States' demurrer to that plea. The defendant's counsel based
his case on the argument that the state's authority to prosecute violations
of its prohibitions laws was grounded on the Eighteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and in principle it was as if both prose-
cutions were by the federal government and hence in violation of the
double jeopardy clause. The Court rejected this contention and put itself
in a position of having to decide the issue of the validity of successive
prosecutions by a state and the federal government. The Court said:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within
the same territory. Each may without interference by the other
enact laws to secure prohibition with the limitation that no legis-
lation can give validity to acts prohibited by the Amendment.
Each government in determining what shall be an offense
against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty,
not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national
and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dig-
nity of both and may be punished by each. The Fifth Amend-
ment . . applies only to proceedings by the federal govern-
ment . and the double jeopardy therein forbidden is a second
prosecution under authority of the federal government after a
36. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
37. The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine in a dictum in Fox v. Ohio,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847). There the court upheld a state statute prohibiting the
uttering of counterfeit coin saying that the defendant's argument that a state prosecution
would bar a later federal one was erroneous. Both could validly punish the conduct if
they saw fit. This dictum was re-iterated in a series of cases prior to the Lanza case.
United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850) ; Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 13 (1852) ; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131 (1889) ; Crossley v. California,
168 U.S. 640 (1898) ; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922).
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first trial for the same offense under the same authority."
The real question of state-federal successive prosecutions was not
even argued by counsel because he restricted his case to the contention
that both sovereigns derived their authority from the same source and
hence the two prosecutions were really by the same sovereign. He did
not argue that even if that were not so, the double jeopardy clause pro-
hibits any type of state-federal successive prosecutions. In light of sev-
eral strong dicta that state-federal successive prosecutions would be
valid,3" counsel may have felt that the argument he made was the only one
available. But in none of those cases was the English case of King v.
Hutchinson cited, and the double jeopardy question was not directly be-
fore the court for decision.
The fact that the offense was a violation of the Prohibition Act
seemed to weigh heavily with the Court. It seemed to feel that if a state
prosecution could bar a federal one, the race of offenders to plead guilty
in sympathetic state courts would thwart enforcement of the federal law."0
This indicates that the court might have gone the other way if the offense
had been more serious and the peculiarities of prohibition law enforce-
ment were absent.
In several cases following Lanra the doctrine was re-affirmed, 3 but
the facts were never such that a direct holding was made on the point
until 1958. Then any speculation that the Supreme Court would abandon
the Lauam rule either because of its injustice or the fact that it made good
sense in prohibition cases but not in other more serious crimes was proved
groundless in Abbate v. United States." The defendant was indicted and
pleaded guilty to forming a conspiracy in Illinois to blow up a microwave
communications network in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana, be-
longing to the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. He was sub-
sequently tried in a federal court for conspiracy to destroy a means of
38. 260 U.S. at 382.
39. See note 2 supra.
40. 260 U.S. at 385.
41. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926) (state indictment for an act for
which the defendant was already under federal indictment was not in derogation of the
federal authority because both could punish for the same act) ; Westfall v. United States,
274 U.S. 256 (1929) (federal government could punish offenses against the state banks'
property rights and double jeopardy would not apply). In Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302
U.S. 253 (1937), the defendant argued that double punishment would result if the Sher-
man Act did not exclude local anti-trust laws. Held, that the double jeopardy clause
would apply and prevent double punishment because both laws emanated from the same
sovereign. This case is identical with the two English cases, King v. Thomas, supra note
28 and King v. Roche, supra note 31. See also Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101
(1943) ; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
42. 359 U.S. 187 (1958).
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communication operated and controlled by the United States. The de-
fendant failed to convince the Court that the Lanza case should be over-
ruled. This case is analogous to Lan.a in that the defendant's three
months sentence in the state court was extremely light in view of the
possible federal penalty of five years in prison. This disparity of penal-
ties gave rise to the same feeling found in the Lana case, that the federal
interest would be thwarted if barred by a state prosecution resulting in
nominal punishment.43 But the Court only mentioned this in passing and
the case seems to eliminate any question as to whether the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits a federal prosecution subsequent to a state prosecution for
the same conduct.
The issue before the court in the Lanza and Abbate cases was
whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited a
federal prosecution after a state prosecution for the same conduct. If
the order of prosecution is reversed the defendant must argue that the
state proceeding is prohibited and this cannot be based on the Fifth
Amendment because it only applies to proceedings of the federal govern-
ment." The first case in the Supreme Court to directly present the ques-
tion of the validity of a state prosecution subsequent to a federal prose-
cution for the same conduct was Bartkus v. Illinois.4" The defendant was
tried and acquitted in a federal court of robbing a federally insured state
bank. He was then convicted in a state court for the robbery and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. Since the Fifth
Amendment wasn't applicable the defendant had to rely on the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that
state action prohibited by the due process clause is only that action which
is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."4 6  The Court concluded
that the judicial history of state-federal successive prosecutions was so
inconclusive and even conflicting that to allow them would not be "repug-
nant to the conscience of mankind."
In Illinois the Lanza rule has not been accepted and has been repudi-
ated by statute. 47 The statute, enacted in 1959, provides that whenever
on the trial of a defendant it is shown that he has previously been tried
under the laws of the Federal government, and the former trial was based
43. Id. at 195.
44. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 180 (1833) ; United States v.
Lanza, supra note 36, at 382.
45. 359 U.S. 121 (1958).
46. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), cited in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. at 127. In the Palko case the Court said that the privileges granted by the Bill of
Rights were saved from state infringement when they had been found to be "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." 302 U.S. at 325.
47. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 601.1 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
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on the conduct for which he is being tried in Illinois, then the previous
prosecution is a sufficient defense. This demonstrates that the Illinois
legislature did not approve of the state or United States Supreme Court
decision in the Bartkus case. Illinois has legislatively adopted the English
rule laid down in King v. Hutchinson. ,
In the wake of the Abbate and Bartkus decisions the Attorney Gen-
eral advised all United States attorneys that the power of successive
prosecutions must be used sparingly and only with his approval. He said:
No federal case should be tried when there has already been a
state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts with-
out the United States Attorney first submitting a recommenda-
tion to the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in the de-
partment. No such recommendation should be approved by the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the division without
having it first brought to my attention."
The Abbate and Bartkus cases seem to settle finally the question of
the validity under federal law of successive prosecutions by the state and
federal governments in favor of the Lan.a rule. Those cases put the
question squarely before the Supreme Court and it took a very firm po-
sition. The sequence of prosecution made no difference except as to the
basis on which the defendants rested their cases. The rule was not re-
stricted to cases where there is a real danger of the defendant's rushing
to a sympathetic jurisdiction to gain immunity from stiffer penalties in
the other, since in the Bartkits case the offence was robbery, and rarely
will it be argued that any jurisdiction is sympathetic to robbers.
The Lanza rule is contrary to the English rule as embodied in King
v. Hutchizson. The basis of the Lanza rule is two-fold. First, it is
premised that the state and federal government are both sovereign and
may punish violations of their respective laws; second, the word "of-
fense" means a violation of a law promulgated by a sovereign. From
the latter it follows that the same conduct will constitute as many "of-
fenses" as there are sovereigns prohibiting that conduct. King v. Hutch-
inson held that a prosecution in any court of competent jurisdiction in a
foreign land would bar further prosecution in England for the same act.
Would anyone suggest that the English courts did not consider England
and Portugual separate sovereigns, or that the English courts did not
accept the fact that each sovereign may pass laws and punish their viola-
tion? They accepted the fact that either sovereign might punish the
conduct but not both. If the word "offense" were defined by looking at
48. 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2509.
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the conduct involved rather than focusing on the number of laws broken
the Lanza rule would not follow. The English rule did not accept that
premise of the Lana rule. Both rules are equally logical results of their
assumed premises. The reason for choosing one instead of the other,
then, lies outside of the logic of the rules themselves.
The crucial factor in accepting the definition of "offense" set out
in the Lanw-a case may have been the concept of federalism. In the early
cases in both state"  and federal courts"0 the double jeopardy problem was
inextricably bound up with the concurrent powers dispute and was a
subsidiary consideration in those cases. It seemed important to many to
establish the premise firmly that the federal and state governments were
each sovereign and each could promulgate criminal laws and punish their
infraction. To hold that a prosecution by a state would bar a later prose-
cution by the federal government would have forced the federal courts
to invalidate much state legislation in areas where the federal government
had also legislated. The striking down of state laws, and hence giving
appearance of derogating the states' sovereignty was avoided by saying
that both could legislate and both could punish violations of their own
legislation. This dictum was reiterated so often that in 1922 when Lanza
was decided it was treated as a rule well-established since 1847."1
Though contrary to English precedent, the Lauza rule can be sup-
ported by an argument based on an analysis of the meaning of the word
"sovereign." If the focus were on the people within the geographical
limits of the jurisdiction alloted to the "sovereign," then it may be
premised that the sovereign enacts criminal laws to protect the interests
of the individuals subject to the sovereign's rule. It would be apparent
that the federal sovereignty is not derived from the same group of in-
dividuals that state sovereignty is derived from. The crucial inquiry in
double jeopardy cases would then be: Are the people's interests protected
by the state law the same as those protected by the federal law? If the
two laws protect different interests each should punish violations of its
laws without regard for the other government's action. This argument
can be illustrated in relation to Abbate v. United States. The state law
protected private property of individuals from destruction and from the
49. State courts which held that the prior prosecution would bar any further prose-
cution: State v. Antonio, 3 S.C. Rep. (2 Tread.) 776 (1816) ; Commonwealth v. Fuller,
49 Mass. (8 Met.) 313 (1844) ; State v. Randall, 2 Aikens 89 (Vt. 1827). Held not a
bar: Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. 421 (1834) ; Hendrick v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. Rep.
Ann. 264 (1834). In all of these cases the issue was state-federal concurrent powers in
the area of counterfeiting and in none of them was the validity of a second prosecution
before the court for decision.
50. See note 37 mipra.
51. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
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threat of destruction arising from a conspiracy to destroy the property.
The federal law could be said to prohibit the conduct but in order to pro-
tect its communications network across the entire country in the interest
of national defense. Distinct interests could almost always be noted and
the result would probably not differ from that reached under the concep-
tualistic "dual sovereignty" theory.
A counterargument to the "protection of interests" rationale would
be that both state and federal laws protect the same interests and one
prosecution vindicates both laws.
Regardless of which rationalization for the Lanz.a rule is preferred
the rule itself is in conflict with common law precedents and we ought to
examine our reasons for the departure to insure that they are as sound
as the reasons for the rule.
OBJECTIONS TO FORMER TESTIMONY
Testimony given in a prior trial may be admissible in evidence as
either an exception to the hearsay rule' or not hearsay at all.2 This theo-
retical difference of opinion, however, does not control the admissibility
of former testimony if certain conditions precedent are fulfilled. The
conditions which must be met before former testimony will be admitted
fall into two groups; one, those having to do with the witness's avail-
ability; and two, those establishing the relevance of the former testimony
to the present proceeding.
Before any part of his former testimony is admissible, the witness
must be dead, insane, so disabled as to be unable to testify,3 a nonresident
not subject to process,' absent by procurement of the opposing party,' or
a resident whom counsel in the exercise of due diligence cannot locate.'
The same conditions for admissibility appear to apply in both criminal
1. McCord v. Strader, 227 Ind. 389, 86 N.E.2d 441 (1949); McCoRMICK, HAND-
1300K OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 480 (1954).
2. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1370 (3rd ed. 1940) ; see also Smith v. U.S., 106 F.2d
726 (1939).
3. See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 272 P.2d 458 (Okla. Cr. 1954). The witness was in
an advanced stage of pregnancy. The court considered her unable to attend and ad-
mitted her former testimony.
4. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Koonce, 233 Ala. 265, 171 So. 269 (1936).
5. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
6. E.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Pinnell, Adm'r, 112 Ind. App. 116, 40 N.E.2d 988 (1942);
United Tel. Co. v. Barva, 83 Ind. App. 61, 147 N.E. 716 (1925) ; Wilson v. State, 175
Ind. 458, 93 N.E. 609 (1911).
